

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02937 01 OF 02 261455Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----125963 261459Z /50

O P 261407Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8102  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRITRITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 2937

EXDIS, FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1-2  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, UNSC, SF, PBOR, LE, IS, SY  
SUBJ: SOUTH LEBANON: MEETING WITH GOL FOREIGN MINISTER  
BOUTROS MAY 26

REF: STATE 134289

1. REASON FOR BOUTROS' REQUEST THAT I CALL ON HIM MAY 26 WAS  
TO PROTEST ABOUT REMARKS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG  
TO BRITISH MAGAZINE "THE MIDDLE EAST" (REPORTED SEPTTEL).  
HOWEVER, I DID HAVE SOME TIME TO DISCUSS WITH BOUTROS RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS RE SOUTH LEBANON.

2. SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH LEBANON. DRAWING ON PARA 1 REFTTEL,  
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I TOLD BOUTROS THAT USG HAD CONTINUED ITS DIALOGUE WITH  
SYRIANS SINCE HE LAST DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH AMBASSADOR  
PARKER ON MAY 5. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN URGING SYRIANS TO  
APPLY WHAT PRESSURE THEY COULD TO KEEP THE PALESTINIANS FROM  
CHALLENGING UNIFIL, THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH SYRIANS THE  
POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING ADF ABOVE THE LITANI, AND THAT WE  
HAD TOLD SYRIANS THAT WE BELIEVED THEY HAD PLAYED IMPORTANT

ROLE IN HELPING TO PRESERVE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN LEBANON. BOUTROS THOUGHT THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING PALESTINIANS HAD HAD GOOD EFFECT. RE DEPLOYMENT OF ADF NORTH OF LITANI, BOUTROS SAID HE DOUBTED SYRIA WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER QUESTION UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE WAS VERY CLOSE-MOUTHED ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS BUT SAID THAT HE EXPECTED A DATE TO BE FIXED FOR PRESIDENT SARKIS TO VISIT DAMASCUS "TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT WEEK."

3. MOVEMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY SOUTH. WHEN I OPENED DISCUSSION OF MOVEMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY (LAF) TO THE SOUTH, BOUTROS REFERRED BACK TO CONVERSATION HE AND SARKIS HAD WITH WALDHEIM DURING LATTER'S VISIT. IN GOL-WALDHEIM MEETING, SARKIS AND BOUTROS HAD POINTED OUT POSSIBLE DANGERS TO UNIFIL OF HAVING LAF UNITS SERVING WITH THEM IN THE SOUTH AND WALDHEIM HAD AGREED THAT QUESTION NEEDED TO BE EXPLORED FURTHER. AFTER WALDHEIM-ARAFAT MEETING, BOUTROS HAD DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT BRIEFLY WITH WALDHEIM AT THE AIRPORT, WALDHEIM HAD TOLD BOUTROS THAT HE AGREED IT WAS NOT PRUDENT TO SEND LAF TROOPS TO THE SOUTH AT THAT TIME. DURING RECENT GUYER VISIT, GOL HAD AGAIN RAISED THE SUBJECT, ASKING IF THERE WERE ANY "NEW ELEMENTS." GUYER HAD SAID NO. GOL HAD THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT UN WAS NOT PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT HAVING LAF UNITS SOUTH OF THE LITANI AT THI POINT.

4. BOUTROS REMARKED THAT HE HAD IMPRESSION UNIFIL DOES NOT  
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REALLY KNOW WHAT IT WANTS; DIFFERENT UNIFIL OFFICIALS SAY DIFFERENT THINGS. HE REMARKED THAT GOL WOULD WELCOME AN OFFICIAL UN/UNIFIL PROPOSAL REGARDING DEPLOYMENT OF LAF UNITS TO THE SOUTH AND THAT IF SUCH PROPOSAL WERE RECEIVED IT WOULD BE ANSWERED PROMPTLY. IF UNIFIL REALLY WANTED SYMBOLIC LAF UNITS, GOL WOULD DO ITS BEST TO HELP. IN THE MEANTIME, GOL WAS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ASSIGN MORE GENDARMES. PRESIDENT SARKIS HAD DISCUSSED ON MAY 25 WITH ISF COMMANDER AL HAJJ PLANS TO SEND AN ADDITIONAL "TWO OR THREE SECTIONS" (200-300 MEN) NEXT WEEK.

5. WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT BE ENCOUNTERED IN SENDING LAF UNITS SOUTH. BOUTROS SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD TOLD WALDHEIM THAT HE, ARAFAT, COULD RESTRAIN THE PALESTINIANS FROM ATTACKING THE LAF BUT THAT ARAFAT THOUGHT SOME GROUPS WITHIN THE LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT WOULD OPPOSE LAF BY FORCE. NATIONAL MOVEMENT WAS CONTINUING TO ARGUE THAT LAF WAS A "CHRISTIAN TOOL" REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNITS TO BE USED, AND WAS INSISTING THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO USE OF LAF IN THE SOUTH UNLESS GOL AGREED TO THEIR DRAFT OF A NEW ARMY LAW. THUS, IF LAF UNITS WENT SOUTH, EVEN AS PART OF A UNIFIL CONVOY, THEY MIGHT BE

ATTACKED. BOUTROS HAD IMPRESSION UN'S MAJOR GOAL WAS TO  
AVOID THIS KIND OF CONFRONTATION. WHEN I MENTIONED POSSIBILITY  
OF TRANSPORT BY SEA OR AIR, BOUTROS REJECTED THIS AS TOO  
EMBARRASSING TO GOL.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 2937

EXDIS, FROM CHARGE

6. RESOLUTION 425 AND THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. BOUTROS  
REPEATED GOL POLICY AS EXPRESSED IN PRESIDENTIAL  
STATEMENT ISSUED MAY 24 (BEIRUT 2918). HE SAID GOL  
HAD DECIDED TO FREEZE THE CAIRO AGREEMENT FOR THE MOMENT,  
SO AS NOT TO INVOLVE THE UN IN THIS MATTER. THE NEXT  
STEP IN SOUTH LEBANON WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; THEN  
UNIFIL COULD ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN  
SOUTH LEBANON. ONCE THIS HAD HAPPENED, ARRANGEMENTS  
COULD BE MADE FOR LAF TO MOVE SOUTH AND FOR GOL TO TAKE  
OVER FROM UNIFIL. I REMARKED THAT THIS MIGHT REQUIRE  
SOME NEW ARRANGEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BOUTROS  
AGREED THAT SOME NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OR ARRANGEMENTS  
WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT THERE WOULD BE NO NEW  
WRITTEN AGREEMENT AS LONG AS HE WAS IN OFFICE. GOL

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ALREADY HAD ENOUGH "AGREEMENTS" WITH PALESTINIANS, NONE OF WHICH PALESTINIANS HAD IMPLEMENTED. BOUTROS SAID HE WANTED ENTRY OF LAF TO THE SOUTH TO BE "POSITIVE" NOT "NEGATIVE" FACTOR, AND THIS MEANT IT HAD TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED. HE HINTED SARKIS INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH ASSAD DURING THEIR "SUMMIT MEETING" NEXT WEEK.

7. BOUTROS EXPRESSED GREAT SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "DOHA STATEMENT" ISSUED BY THE PALESTINIANS FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER HOSS ON MAY 24 (BEIRUT 2919) AND DECLINED TO INTERPRET THE PHRASE "ELIMINATE ALL ARMED MANIFESTATION IN THE SOUTH" (WHICH APPEARS IN POINT 3 OF THE DECLARATION). HE SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND OFF THE RECORD, HE FELT THAT THE PLO STATEMENT WAS PURELY A TACTIC DESIGNED TO CALM PUBLIC OPINION BOTH IN LEBANON AND ABROAD AND TO ENCOURAGE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ON SCHEDULE.

8. COMMENT: BECAUSE BOUTROS' PURPOSE IN CALLING ME IN WAS TO PROTEST AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S ALLEGED REMARKS, AND BECAUSE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS WAITING TO SEE HIM, I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS FULL RANGE OF SUBJECTS OUTLINED IN PARA 2 REFTEL. I HOPE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO WHEN I SEE BOUTROS AGAIN TO GIVE HIM DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE ON AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S STATEMENTS. IN MEANTIME, NEXT STEP MAY BE TO DISCUSS WITH UN/UNIFIL EXACTLY WHAT KIND OF LAF UNITS IT WOULD LIKE GOL TO SEND WHERE AND WHEN AND HAVE THEM PREPARE FORMAL REQUEST TO GOL.

9. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO CALL ON PRIME MINISTER HOSS 1) TO DISCUSS GENERAL STATUS OF GOL

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PALESTINIAN TALKS (FROM WHICH BOUTROS HAS DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED HIMSELF), 2) TO EXPLAIN POINTS MADE IN STATE 126253 WHICH HOSS COULD PASS ON TO PALESTINIAN LEADERS, AND 3) TO EXPLORE WITH HIM POINTS IN PARA 2 REFTEL RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT OF LAF TO THE SOUTH. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS ASAP.  
LANE

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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**TAGS:** PEPR, PINT, PBOR, SF, LE, IS, SY, US, UNSC, (BOUTROS, FOUAD)  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014